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Abstract: This article explores the consequence of quotas on the level of diversity observed in 
legislators’ professional and political experience. We examine how party system and electoral system 
features that are meant to favor female representation – such as gender quotas for candidate selection 
or placement mandates on electoral lists – affect the composition of legislatures, by altering the mix of 
professional and political qualifications held by its members. Using data collected for all legislators 
initially seated to the current session of the European Parliament (EP) – one of the largest and most 
diverse democratically elected legislatures in the world, we find that quotas eliminate gendered 
differences in experience within the institution, particularly when used in conjunction with placement 
mandates that ensure female candidates are featured on electoral lists in viable positions. Our findings 
suggest that electoral institutions can generally help to ‘level the playing field’ between the 
backgrounds of men and women in elected office, while also increasing the presence of desirable 
qualities among EP representatives of both genders.  
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1. Introduction  
Scholars link increases in the descriptive representation of diverse backgrounds with positive 
outcomes for representation, writ large. Within this literature, a focus on gender and representation is 
particularly prominent. Higher levels of women’s descriptive political representation boost 
legitimacy and trust in institutions (Mansbridge 1999), greater political engagement and activism 
(Barnes and Burchard 2013; Campbell and Wolbrecht 2006; Wolbrecht and Campbell 2007), and 
increased political knowledge (Fridkin and Kenney 2014). Other works explore more substantive 
effects for women’s descriptive representation within a legislature, such as impacts on legislative 
output and efficiency (Anzia and Berry 2011; Volden and Wiseman 2014). Yet another body of 
literature investigates ways to improve women’s access to political office, exploring the impact of 
electoral institutions (Bernauer, Giger, and Rosset 2015; Valdini 2012), candidate selection (Krook 
2010b; Luhiste 2015; Pruysers et al. 2017), and gender quotas (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2010; 
Krook 2010a; Matland 2006). Research on gender quotas, in particular, has focused on the types that 
are the most effective in securing elected positions for women (e.g., Schwindt‐Bayer 2009), as well 
as the qualities of women who are selected and then elected, both with and without the use of quotas 
(Baltrunaite et al. 2014; Davidson-Schmich 2016; Murray 2010; Schwindt-Bayer 2011; Weeks and 
Baldez 2015). The latter literature tends to focus on the quality of female legislators in terms of 
political experience and performance in office. In addition, Besley (2017) has even shown that quotas 
effect the quality of men that are recruited by parties once a gender quota is in effect, raising the 
competence of male politicians alongside raising the level of female representation. We contribute to 
this literature by exploring the aggregate impact of quotas on the diversity of political and 
professional background experience among male and female legislators elected to the European 
Parliament (EP).   
 While most scholars would agree that increasing the number of women in office is a 
normatively desirable development, the use of gender quotas to achieve this outcome is not without 
controversy. Arguments against the use of gender quotas tend to center on the potential decrease in 
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quality brought on by ‘quota candidates’ or a reduction of merit-based competition that quotas might 
entail. With respect to merit, opponents of quotas argue that a lack of female representation is simply 
the result of individual choices made by women not to opt for political careers; artificially inflating 
the number of women on electoral ballots makes competition more about identity than quality 
(Baltrunaite et al. 2014; Holzer and Neumark 2000). Another perception of women elected using 
quotas is that they may not have been able to obtain office on their own and are therefore less 
qualified to serve (Murray 2010). Not only does this perception discredit women in office, but it 
suggests that quotas may actually decrease the quality of political institutions on the whole 
(Lovenduski 2005; Murray 2010). However, research specifically examining the women who enter 
elected office after the implementation of quotas has shown that these concerns are largely baseless. 
In fact, most of this literature uses single-country studies to show that “quota women” are not inferior 
to men or “non-quota women”, both in their qualifications for office and in their ability to work 
within legislatures (Baltrunaite et al. 2014; Murray 2010; Weeks and Baldez 2015).  
We expand upon this debate by examining the consequences of gender quotas for the 
diversity of experience witnessed in a legislature’s composition. However, instead of examining the 
impact of quotas on the competency or qualifications of female legislators, we ask whether the 
presence of quotas is associated with a different overall composition of legislatures in significant 
ways. Using the unique electoral structure of the EP, where some members are elected under national 
and party-level quotas systems and others are not, we are able to draw comparisons between those 
systems where quotas are associated with no gaps between men and women’s professional and 
political experience those in which quotas continue not to be used.  Our analysis speaks to a larger 
debate on the extent to which quotas are associated with the removal of common barriers to entry for 
women who run for office in Europe. In general, we find that systems using a combination of quotas 
and placement mandates, which are rules requiring the nomination of women to winnable 
constituencies or list positions (Schwindt‐Bayer 2009),   have more balanced representation between 
men and women and also higher levels of qualified politicians from both genders.  
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The EP makes for an interesting test case for this inquiry. Not only is it among the most 
gender-equal legislatures in the world, but it is also comprised of directly-elected representatives 
from 28 liberal democracies and more than a hundred national political parties. While EU law sets a 
loose, common framework for EP elections, it also provides national parties and electoral systems 
with a great deal of agency to dictate the terms under which these elections will take place. With 
respect to the promotion of women in elected office, nine of the 28 EU member states actively 
incentivize the election of women via gender quotas that are directly required by national electoral 
law, in addition to dozens of national political parties who do so at an organizational level (Prpic and 
Chahri 2017).  
Using individual-level data on the previous professional and political experience of members 
of the European Parliament (MEPs), we compare the composition of delegations elected to the EP 
using quotas, both with and without electoral list placement mandates, to the institution as a whole. 
We are thereby able to leverage the uniquely diverse electoral features of the EP to assess the impact 
of quotas on the composition of the parliament in a way that single-country studies cannot, making a 
unique empirical contribution to the broader literature on gender quotas.  
Our findings demonstrate that while gender quotas and other institutional decisions meant to 
boost the quantity of female representation are significantly associated with indicators of professional 
experience and political expertise, they are not the direct cause of differences in the experience and 
expertise of MEPs. In fact, in systems where quotas and placement mandates are in use, differences 
between men and women tend not to exist, with respect to previous political and professional 
experience. In addition, we find that systems with quotas contain more experienced MEPs overall, 
across both males and females, which thereby increases the general quality of the EP. These findings 
echo the work of scholars from other legislative venues and show that quotas and protocols intended 
to increase female representation may not only ‘open the door’ or ‘even the playing field’ for elected 
women, but may also more broadly improve the quality of representatives present in the legislature.  
 
‘United in Diversity?’ 
 
 
4 
2. Assessing the Impact of Quotas on Female Representation 
A number of studies have considered the degree to which quotas and other mechanisms for boosting 
female representation are effective at increasing the number of female representatives, as well as 
enhancing the quality of representation. We begin by discussing the traditional barriers to entry 
present in electoral contexts that impact on both the quantity and composition (in terms of 
experience) of the pool of female candidates in democratic societies. We then focus on gender quotas 
as one institutional tool to can be used to overcome these barriers. 
Improving the Recruitment Environment:  
Women have traditionally faced barriers to election that affect both the supply and demand sides of 
the political recruitment environment. Among these barriers, electoral systems are one of the most 
important. At a basic level, the difference between proportional representation (PR) systems and 
single-member majority districts (SMD) affects women by defining the scope of competition. The 
nature of this competition also affects both the type of women willing to run and the type of women 
that parties nominate. SMD and open-list PR systems require women to compete directly against 
other candidates. In single member districts this is only their opponent, while in open-list PR systems 
this may be both their fellow party members and opponents from other parties. This means that they 
compete on their personal merits, either alone or alongside the merits of their group, whereas closed-
list PR systems structure competition around the group. This influences the type of candidates that 
will run for office, because not all women feel qualified to compete in an individual manner. Fox and 
Lawless (2004) show that women doubt their qualifications to run for office more so than men, even 
when they are objectively as qualified. Kanthak and Woon (2015) use an experimental design to 
show that women are more averse to the competitive nature of elections, in general, and are only 
more likely to run if the private costs of doing so can be eliminated. Accordingly, when women do 
run, we might expect them to be a particular ‘kind’ of woman, in terms of their experience, 
qualifications, and ambition. 
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Women who run for office in more individually-competitive electoral systems tend to share 
similar characteristics and qualifications for office. Schwindt-Bayer (2011), in her study of women in 
Latin American legislatures, finds that women who win elections for legislative office represent a 
particular type of candidate. Specifically, she finds that these women tend to represent more 
traditionally defined ‘male’ roles. To compete against men, these women are highly educated and 
have considerable political and professional experience in areas that traditionally lead to political 
careers. They are also less likely to be married or have a family and are more likely to be politically 
ambitious. In other words, they are like the men that they run against and may not be providing the 
‘women’s’ perspective that descriptive representation is thought to entail.  
Being more ‘like men’ has also shown to be lucrative in elections outside of Latin America. 
For example, Huddy and Terkildsen (1993) show that candidates with ‘masculine’ traits are 
considered more competent in important policy areas like the military and the economy, which can 
be helpful in winning elections. But displaying masculine characteristics also has a downside. More 
recent research has shown that voters also prefer female politicians with more traditional family 
roles, which can put women candidates in a “double bind” (Teele, Kalla, and Rosenbluth 2018). 
Having the traits similar to men that signal competence and the ambition to run for office may make 
a female candidate appear less likeable and overall less competitive.  
Each of these factors, combined with the fact that women are rarely encouraged to run for 
office in the way that men are (Fox and Lawless 2004), contributes to an undersupply of women 
across the board. It’s no wonder that women, regardless of their qualifications, are less likely to run 
for office than men and that legislatures still have relatively fewer women than men overall.  So, how 
can women be encouraged to run for office? Institutional rules, like quotas, can help to create a 
female-friendly environment to encourage ambitious women.  
Parties in a variety of national contexts have therefore experimented with the usage of gender 
quotas at the nomination stage, where various mechanical thresholds require parties to select certain 
numbers of female candidates. These quotas may be set as either national law or as internal party 
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policies and vary widely from overtly tokenistic schemes to ones meant to ensure full gender parity. 
What they have in common is a requirement for female candidates that can eliminate some of the 
more individually competitive aspects of candidate selection in non-quota systems, which encourages 
a more diverse pool of candidates. 
Quotas and the Dynamics of Representation  
That gender quotas can lower barriers in the recruitment environment of elections for women is 
largely supported in the quota literature. A number of studies examine how electoral laws and 
policies – particularly gender parity quotas at the recruitment and nomination stage – affect legislator 
quality within the national political systems of Europe. Allen, Cutts, and Campbell (2016) examine 
this question within the UK, following the introduction of party-level gender quotas in 1997. They 
find that women elected under the new quota system are not significantly different than women who 
were not nominated under quotas, with respect to their backgrounds, vote totals, and further abilities 
for political advancement. Similarly, Murray (2010) finds that women’s background qualifications 
and experience, prior to election to the French parliament, were not reduced by the introduction of 
quotas; there were simply more women listed on the ballot. Such findings suggest that women may 
not be more (or less) qualified when elected on quotas, but that their ‘numerical’ representation 
successfully increased.  
 The question of whether an increased number of female representatives elected via gender 
quotas affects the overall background qualities of legislators has also been addressed at some length. 
Taking advantage of a natural experiment in Italy, where quotas were introduced and then removed, 
both Baltrunaite et al. (2014) and Weeks and Baldez (2015) find that quotas increased the numbers of 
women elected to the Italian parliament. In the case of Baltrunaite et al.’s study, the increased 
number of female representatives corresponded with a heightened level of education across all 
legislators, while it reduced the number of male legislators without advanced degrees. Weeks and 
Baldez’ work echoes this finding, concluding that gender quotas helped to boost the number of 
women in national office who had prior local political experience and lowered absenteeism across 
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the national legislative body. Somewhat pessimistically, however, these same trends reversed, shortly 
after the Italian quotas were removed.  
In addition, O’Brien and Rickne (2016) show that the strict gender parity required by local 
Swedish social democratic party boards not only increased women’s representation within the party, 
but also enabled more women to advance into national positions of political leadership more quickly 
than their colleagues from parties without such regulations. One of the positive externalities of this 
change in party leadership was the removal of mediocre male party leaders. Besley et al. (2017) 
suggest that increased competition for male seats after the introduction of a quota made it harder for 
mediocre leaders to nominate mediocre men in elections and maintain their grip on power in the 
party. The result was that more competent leaders arose, sometime through the support of women 
making the most use of the new quotas. These leaders than nominated more competent candidates 
overall, therefore raising the entire level of quality of candidates across both genders.  
Finally, experimental work has demonstrated that the elimination of competition for 
leadership roles encourages qualified women to seek out these opportunities. Neiderle, Segal, and 
Vesterlund (2013) argue that the absence of women in high profile and competitive jobs might be 
caused by the competitive environment, in which highly qualified women choose not to enter 
competitions that they could win. They use experimental evidence to show that introducing 
affirmative action policies not only encourages more women to participate in competitive 
tournaments but also maintains the overall quality of all participants. In a similar study, Kanthak and 
Woon (2015) test whether women are more sensitive to competitive elections than men, regardless of 
their objective ability to win or their beliefs about others abilities. They find that even qualified 
women are averse to electoral competition and show that removing the competitive aspects of 
elections in favor of volunteer opportunities increases the likelihood that women will step forward as 
candidates.  
In sum, the literature suggests that quota laws and other institutional choices meant to boost 
gender parity increase the number of female representatives, but do not hurt the quality of 
‘United in Diversity?’ 
 
 
8 
representation offered by female legislators. Indeed, quotas may even help to raise the quality bar 
across the bodies in which these rules are found by both introducing competent and quality female 
candidates and making the nomination of less qualified men more difficult We therefore expect the 
presence of quotas in European elections to also impact the type of legislator elected from European 
Union member states that use them.  
Contextual Factors and Women’s Recruitment 
In addition to institutional rules like quotas, a variety of contextual factors and party characteristics 
also affect the recruitment environment. At the national level, the inclusion of more women in 
politics, lower incumbency rates, and overall increased gender equality can encourage more women 
in office. When women are in elected positions, they serve as role models for other women and girls 
and encourage political participation (Barnes and Burchard 2013; Campbell and Wolbrecht 2006; 
Wolbrecht and Campbell 2007). When overall gender equality is high, traditional gender roles and 
stereotypes about women in office are less pronounced, encouraging more women to seek office 
(Krook and Norris 2014). Party characteristics such as ideology, the organization of candidates 
selection, and the number of women activists within the party also play a role (Caul 2001). Here, the 
literature finds that the most gender-equal legislatures will come from countries in which the 
recruitment environment is the most positive towards women’s issues and gender equality concerns. 
This cultural predisposition should be helpful to women’s recruitment at both the party and at the 
national level. Furthermore, it suggests that an electoral system that combines proportional 
representation with gender quotas should be most helpful at increasing women’s descriptive 
representation in legislatures. Having considered the general picture, we now examine how these 
factors are at play in Europe’s largest directly-elected legislature.  
Women’s Representation in the European Parliament   
In many ways, the EP operates as a microcosm for the comparative study of institutional design in 
Europe. While MEPs follow a common set of rules and procedures within the assembly, they are 
elected via systems that vary widely from country to country and come from parties that represent the 
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full spectrum of political beliefs present across the continent. Reflective of the European Union’s 
(EU) motto, ‘United in Diversity,’ EP elections provide an interesting empirical example of the 
various systems and peoples found across the EU, unified within a singular institution.  
However, the EP is also an outlier with respect to female representation. The most-recent 
May 2014 EP elections produced an all-time high for women’s representation at the EU level, with 
female members of the EP (MEPs) occupying more than a third of seats in the multinational 
legislative assembly. By the midpoint of the term in 2017, this number had grown to 37.9% of all 
MEPs—making the EP one of the world’s most gender-equal legislatures. At the same time, only 22 
national legislatures – six of which are EU member states – from around the world could boast a 
higher degree of female representation (Prpic and Chahri 2017). What explains this success in 
boosting the number of female representatives and what are its consequences for the EP?  
Fortin-Rittberger and Rittberger (2015) examine women’s recruitment to the EP during the 
2009 elections and find that female MEPs benefit from recruitment strategies that allow for 
centralized party selection mechanisms at a mix of regional and national levels. In other work, they 
also find that women are more likely to win election to the EP when they come from countries or 
parties that employ gender quotas, are nominated to closed lists, and come from districts with greater 
numbers of MEPs (Fortin-Rittberger and Rittberger 2014; Lühiste 2015). While these findings are 
broadly in keeping with the thrust of the literature that we discuss above, it is particularly interesting 
to note that, while all EP elections are inherently proportional, the varying sizes of country 
delegations suggest that some elections are more proportional than others.  
Beyond the mechanical effects of differing electoral systems, other scholars examine intra-
party differences for the success of women’s election to the EP. Lühiste and Kenny (2016) find that 
while female MEPs are more likely to come from leftist parties, which are more likely to use 
inclusive quotas, women from more conservative and rightist parties are actually more likely to 
demonstrate relevant political experience and may be more successful in advancing their legislative 
careers. Aldrich (2018b) finds that centralization of party organizations affects the likelihood of 
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selection and nomination for women candidates to the EP. Chiva (2014) finds that the traditional left-
right ideological spectrum is less successful than the pro-/anti-EU dimension in accounting for the 
presence of female MEPs from Central and Eastern European member states. Her findings suggest 
that anti-EU parties may view pro-gender equality as a ‘Western’ norm that is imposed upon parties 
from the EU. Finally, Xydias (2016) examines the role of the second-order elections model on 
women’s representation and discovers that women MEPs are at a comparative advantage for EP 
elections when they come from national parties that take the EP less seriously and are therefore less 
competitive with their candidate selection practices.  
While this mixed bag of cultural and institutional variables may make election to the EP 
more or less difficult for certain types of women, Fortin-Rittberger and Rittberger (2014) also explain 
how the EP may be a particularly attractive place for women to work, as compared with national 
political systems. Because EP elections are less competitive, ambitious women can be advantaged in 
both ballot selection and election times – as parties and voters pay less attention to who is being 
elected. Because EP elections are all at least somewhat proportional, women do not suffer the high 
barriers to entry faced in majoritarian elections. And because the EU is more gender-mainstreamed 
and typically more developed in its gender-equality policies, women MEPs may find a neater 
substantive fit with EU policymaking.i  
In sum, the EP appears to have more female legislators than many national parliaments for 
the same mix of cultural and institutional reasons that many European legislatures have more female 
legislators than in other parts of the world. However, given the diverse national systems that coexist 
within the EP space, every female MEP who benefits from a more gender-equal national political 
environment and comes from a political party with advantageous selection criteria may also work 
alongside MEPs from political environments that are less friendly to women’s political recruitment. 
Therefore, we now consider how the sources of variation present in women’s selection to the EP may 
also influence the dynamics of representation on offer there. 
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3. Theorizing the Effect of Gender Quotas on Representative Qualities 
Thus far, we have considered the effect of quotas on women’s legislative representation, with a 
particular emphasis on the intra-institutional diversity of the EP. In this section, we move on to 
theorize how the varied usage of gender quotas may also have unintended side effects on the qualities 
that MEPs demonstrate in their work as legislators. While the EP was once viewed as an overly 
complex and technical institutions with an extraordinary turnover rate among legislators (e.g., Daniel 
and Metzger 2018), its increased professionalization since the introduction of legislative co-decision 
with the Council in the early 1990s has led to a growing class of politicians whose primary ambition 
lies in working for the European body (e.g., Daniel 2015). At the same time, national parties have 
increasingly used European elections strategically to further their national and European goals 
(Aldrich 2018a; Pemstein, Meserve, and Bernhard 2015), often favoring incumbent MEPs in the 
selection of candidates (Meserve, Pemstein, and Bernhard 2018). Nonetheless, incumbent MEPs are 
not the only politicians recruited for EP elections. 
The seniority-driven hierarchies found in many of the EP’s internal institutions (Daniel 2013; 
Ringe 2010; Yoshinaka, McElroy, and Bowler 2010) suggest that national parties should seek out 
politicians who are prepared to take on the subject matter dealt with at the EP level, as well as to 
protect career MEPs. While we expect that all parties have the rational incentive to select high 
quality politicians for office, when it comes to women’s recruitment and selection initiatives, we 
expect that parties using quotas will also feature a higher number of women in electable positions. 
This will have the related effect of an increased number of quality female politicians, while also 
making the remaining spots left for male politicians more competitive. In other words, we expect that 
parties that use quotas will field a quality list of both male and female candidates, but that they may 
also have fewer spots left over for less qualified men. This will lead such parties’ politicians to be of 
an overall higher quality.  
In the absence of direct previous experience in the EP, the literature consistently views 
political experience as synonymous with quality candidacy. We thusly expect that when gender 
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quotas require parties to bring in new candidates, these candidates should not only be 
disproportionally women, but should also be more experienced in politics. For this contention and all 
others, we further expect that quotas will be most effective if they operate alongside placement 
mandates, which force parties not to squander female candidates in unlikely electoral positions. In 
other words, our first hypothesis is as follows: 
H1: Countries and Parties using gender quotas (alongside placement mandates) will be 
associated with MEPs who have higher levels of previous political experience.  
However, political experience is not the only important aspect for completing effective work 
in EP policymaking. Specifically, within the literature on the committee-driven nature of EP 
legislating, the highly technical and oftentimes apolitical nature of EP work is cited as necessitating 
the recruitment of MEPs who are more likely to be equipped for the demands of specialized 
committee work (Daniel 2013, but see also Yordanova 2013). Within the context of gender rules, we 
expect to see a similar relationship as in H1, whereby parties that use gender quotas will recruit 
MEPs that demonstrate higher levels of the sorts of education and professional expertise that are 
most relevant for EP work. However, what makes an MEP a ‘quality’ one in this case is not just 
political experience. More specifically, we anticipate that MEPs from such parties will have more 
advanced educations and come from employment backgrounds that are more directly compatible 
with EP work, such as law, international relations, or finance.  
H2: Countries and Parties using gender quotas (alongside placement mandates) will be 
associated with MEPs who have higher levels of relevant professional expertise for EP work.  
To summarize the full argument, we view gender quotas and placement mandates to be 
useful institutional innovations that can increase women’s descriptive representation because they 
eliminate some traditional barriers to entry for female candidates. Because the candidate pool is 
increased when more women are encouraged and recruited for office, quotas should raise the bar for 
the presence of legislators with characteristics more broadly suited to the technical nature of 
legislative work in the EP. Naturally, a variety of additional variables may also contribute to the 
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success of national parties to send politicians to the EP with heightened political experience and 
relevant professional expertise. We explore such alternate expectations in the following section. 
4. First Cut: Identifying Gendered Differences in MEP Quality   
In order to test a theory about gender quotas and legislator experience, we explore the distribution of 
experience in the EP in 2014 in two ways. We first explore the previous political experience of both 
male and female MEPs, before examining the kinds of expertise gained from their professional 
backgrounds. In terms of political experience, we identify those MEPs who have previously held 
positions on national party boards, served as members of national parliaments, held local office, or 
who are returned incumbents from the EP. The measures of relevant professional expertise identify 
MEPs that have either demonstrated professional experience or educational training, prior to their EP 
mandate, that is directly related to a particular policy area prescient to the EP’s specialized 
committee system. These categories include MEPs with expertise in agriculture, legal experience, 
medicine, economics and finance, transportation and telecommunications, education and teaching, 
international affairs, and journalism.ii 
We begin by examining simple associative patterns between all MEPs elected in 2014, their 
levels of political experience and professional expertise, and their gender. Table 1 displays 
descriptive information on the percentage of MEPs having each type of experience and expertise 
across gender and the results of a chi-square test for significant differences between genders. The 
first subset of columns (1) presents the percentage of women, men, and total MEPs with each 
category of experience for the entire EP. The second subset (2) presents the percentage of MEPs 
from member states that use any quota and the third (3) presents the percentage of MEPs in states 
that use both a quota and a placement mandate. Thus, all percentages are calculated based upon the 
total number of MEPs. For example, for gendered differences of MEPs that have experience as a 
former MP, the first subset indicates that 35.37% of all MEPs have this type experience. However, 
female MEPs with this type of experience make up only 11.30% of the EP and male MEPs with such 
experience represent 24.07% of the EP. The data from quota countries (subset 2) tells us that only 
‘United in Diversity?’ 
 
 
14 
12.77% of all MEPs come from quota countries and have experience as a national MP; 3.46% of all 
MEPs are female former national MPs from quota countries and 9.31% of the EP are male former 
MPs from quota countries, and so on.   
The columns for the entire population of MEPs, signified through bold and underlined cells, 
show that differing levels of experience in national party office, past national parliamentary 
membership and having held a local office are each significantly gendered (in other words, the 
likelihood of male and female MEPs to display different propensities to appear in each category is 
significantly different). More specifically, there are significantly more men than women with these 
types of experience in the EP. On the other hand, gender is not significantly associated with 
differences in the level of many professional background categories, nor are there many differences 
in age. This suggests that, on the whole, differences in MEP background that are attributable to 
gender are mostly limited to political experience.  
[Table 1 about here.] 
In contrast to the population as a whole, if we only examine patterns among the subsets of 
MEPs that come from countries with quotas or countries with both quotas and placement mandates, 
then these patterns change. Information on quotas at the national level (i.e., legislated quotas) is taken 
from Freidenvall and Dahlerup (2013). The columns show that combining quotas with placement 
mandates effectively eliminates significant gendered differences for political experience. For 
example, simple quotas reduce the presence of significant gendered differences in previous local 
office and national party office, but the addition of placement mandates eliminates significant 
difference in all forms of political experience. These preliminary results show that while differences 
in experience across genders do exist in the entire population of MEPs, they do not exist in those 
countries where both quotas and placement mandates are in place.  
5. Explanations for Women’s Representation: Logistic Regression Results and Discussion  
While the associative tests indicate that differences exist between male and female MEPs, and that 
these differences are mitigated by the presence of quota and placement rules, there are several other 
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factors that can also lead to the selection and election of experienced legislators. In order to test the 
hypothesized relationships across a variety of national and party-level factors, we next model a series 
of logistic regressions that control for various institutional and cultural differences at the national 
level. These models take each type of professional and political experience and expertise separately, 
as their dependent variable. In these models, we use an ordinal measure of quota strength, National 
Gender Quota, to measure the variance in gender quota laws at the national level. This variable takes 
three values, 0 in countries where no quotas exists, 1 in countries where simple quotas exist that 
require no specific placement of women on electoral lists, and 2 for countries where placement 
mandates exist.iii In keeping with our hypotheses, the expectation is that higher values of the quota 
index will correspond with a heightened presence of experience and expertise. 
In addition to these national characteristics, the models also include additional indicators that 
may have bearing on the presence of certain types of experience and expertise and that may also help 
or hurt women’s descriptive representation. We use an updated version of Gallagher’s (1991) 
measure of the disproportionality (based upon calculations from European Election Survey 2009) of 
the national electoral system (Disproportionality) and the presence of Closed Lists in European 
elections to identify variations across differing national electoral systems. Districts accounts for the 
number of electoral districts used for European elections in a given country.iv Each of these 
indicators proxies for institutional environments that may impact on the ability of women to be 
elected. In order to capture the gendered nature of the national political environment, we use three 
measures that address the general level of gender equality in each EU member state: Women with 
Degree, which measures the percentage of women per 100 men with an advanced education in each 
member state,v Women in National Parliament, which provides the percentage of each national 
legislature that is female,vi and Gender Equality Index. This index is a composite indicator of general 
levels of equality across work, money, knowledge, time, power and health provided by the European 
Institute for Gender Equality .vii  
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We begin by estimating a set of regression models that include country-level data on all 
MEPs that were initially seated in 2014, excluding replacement MEPs. We then re-estimate the 
models, using only the subset of MEPs for which party data was available. For each dependent 
variable, we estimate models using the entire sample of MEPs, just female MEPs, and just male 
MEPs, in order to also test the effects of quotas across both genders. All logistic models use country-
clustered standard errors to account for unobserved heterogeneity at the country level. 
Country-Level Quotas and Experience 
Figure 1 presents the results of the logistic regression analysis for a few key areas of professional and 
political experience for MEPs across the three data groupings (all MEPs, female MEPs, and male 
MEPs). The first set of plots report the coefficients and 95% confidence intervals for the effect of 
national gender quotas and placement mandates on the presence of MEPs with political experience 
and the second set of plots report the coefficients for relevant professional experience and 
expertise.viii 
[Figure 1 about here.] 
Examining the coefficient plots for previous political experience shows mixed results for the 
effect of national gender quotas across women and men. Here we see the average effect of national 
gender quotas on the entire population of MEPs is not significantly associated with the likelihood of 
an MEP demonstrating most types of previous political experience with only national MPs showing a 
significant and positive relationship. However, testing the relationship between quotas and political 
experience across the gendered subgroups highlights more nuanced results that are consistent with 
H1.  Most notably, the presence of gender quotas does correlate with the likelihood that women will 
have national experience (Former MP) prior to entering the EP, as well as the likelihood that men 
will be have held national party office. This provides evidence in support of H1, which predicted that 
countries with national gender quotas will have more politically experienced MEPs. The positive and 
significant effect of the quotas demonstrate the increased likelihood that both male and female MEPs 
have had previous national experience that may be useful to them in their work in the EP.  
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Interestingly, Figure 1 also shows that quota countries are significantly less likely to contain 
reelected MEPs from the previous term (marked as incumbents), which does not conform to basic 
assumptions made by H1, but the effect appears to be driven by a significant decrease of male 
incumbents when quotas are used. While the lack of longitudinal information in the structure of our 
dataset makes it difficult to isolate the mechanism at play specifically, this supports our argument 
that when countries or parties include gender quotas with placement mandates, competition increases 
for male MEPs, who may be less assured of winning re-election. In particular, the presence of a 
national gender quota decreases the predicted probability that an MEP will be a male incumbent by 
about 11.4%, with placement mandates reducing this by an additional 9.3%. This reduces the male 
incumbency advantage by nearly half: falling from a 43% predicted likelihood, when no quotas are in 
place, to only about 22.5% when quotas and mandates are used, ceteris paribus.ix With respect to 
professional experience, Figure 1 also shows that both men and women from quota countries are 
significantly more likely to hold qualifications in law and international affairs, and men are more 
likely to have a PhD when they come from countries in which national-level gender quotas exist, 
both of which are attributes that are useful for success in the EP’s technical ‘working parliament’ 
environment. This provides evidence in support of H2, which argues that national-level quotas should 
increase the number of professionally experienced candidates entering the EP.  Of course, the nature 
of gender equality within each member state might also influence the type of experience MEPs have 
as professional and educational success might be subject to gendered patterns within society. In order 
to account for some of these patterns, we included several controls variables for gender equality both 
in politics and education and an overall general measure. The relationship of these control variables 
to our experience categories is presented in Tables A1.1 and A1.2 in the appendix. These results 
show that these measure are, in most cases, not significant predictors of experience. The most notable 
relationship is between women’s education and experience, where the education for women is 
significantly associated with more women in international affairs, and between women in national 
parliaments and local politicians which also has a significant and positive relationship.  
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 [Figure 2 about here.]  
In order to further evaluate the substantive effects of quotas and placement mandates 
described above, Figure 2 presents the predicted probability that female MEPs will have former 
experience as a national MP (left), expertise in legal professions (center), and expertise in 
international affairs (right), given the presence of a national quota law in their home country. The 
results suggest that the power of gender quotas to increase the likelihood of these types of experience 
comes mostly with the presence of placement mandates, in conjunction with quotas. In fact, the 
confidence intervals for the Former MPs show that the effect of implementing a placement mandate 
nearly doubles the effect of a quota. The predicted probability of a woman holding previous 
experience as an MP increases by half from the baseline, jumping from roughly 9% to nearly 14% 
when simple quotas are instituted. The inclusion of a placement mandate increases this likelihood 
again, to over 20%. The power of placement mandates is also evident when evaluating experience in 
international affairs. The right panel of the figure shows that the effect of national quotas is 
essentially indistinguishable from the absence of quotas with overlapping confidence intervals and 
average probabilities of about 16% and 20%.  However, placement mandates increase the predicted 
probably of international experience by an additional 10%.x    
The center column of Figure 2 shows similar results with respect to legal experience, 
suggesting that the EP appears to benefit from more women with legal experience when countries use 
both a simple quota and a placement mandate. Here, the baseline probability that a female MEP has 
legal experience is about 12%, with a quota increasing this probability to about 23% and placement 
mandates increasing this to about 39%. Again, the use of the quota combined with a mandate has a 
significantly larger effect than the use of simple quotas. In this case, national quotas also have a 
similar effect on men, increasing the probability they will have legal experience by about 5% with 
quotas and 10.5% with placement mandates from a baseline of about 17.5%. These results provide 
additional evidence in support of H1 with respect to women in the EP, and also highlights how 
placement mandates are a powerful tool for increasing the level of women with relevant experience 
‘United in Diversity?’ 
 
 
19 
and expertise in the EP.  Overall, these models show fairly substantial effects that support H1 and H2 
and suggest that quotas are generally good for increasing the professional expertise among those 
entering the Parliament and that placement mandates amplify these effects. 
 In assessing the impact of quotas on the type of MEP expertise, it is also important to note 
the influence of other factors that may bias for or against the sorts of expertise examined above.  
Among common electoral system variables, we found significant and independent effects for closed 
list systems, disproportionally, and the number districts. Regardless of MEP gender, more 
disproportional systems tended to have more former MPs and local politicians in the EP while states 
with more districts tended to have less former MPs. This result is unsurprising, given that electoral 
systems with several, less proportional districts will have many party lists that elect only a single or a 
few MEPs. Therefore, we would expect to see more homogeneity in the types of candidates that enter 
the EP through these systems.  A more important effect is that of closed list ballots. In the model for 
political experience, this variable increases the likelihood that men will have political experience 
while decreasing the likelihood that women will have political experience. Figure 3 shows the 
coefficients of this variable across genders.  
[Figure 3 about here.]  
As Figure 3 shows, closed list ballots appear to increase the likelihood that all MEPs will 
have experience as incumbents and local politicians and decrease the likelihood that women will 
have been former MPs. This result is especially interesting, given that national gender quotas were 
shown to increase this type of experience in women. This suggests that closed ballots may attenuate 
the positive effects of gender quotas on female MEPs. In order to explore this further, Figure 4 
presents the effect of national gender quotas on the predicted probability that a female MEP will have 
served in the national parliament in states with closed list systems and states that have open ballots.  
As the figure shows, states with closed list ballots in place have, on average, fewer total women in 
the EP that have served in national parliaments than do states with open list systems.  
[Figure 4 about here.] 
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However, the overall effect of gender quotas on recruiting MEPs with previous expertise remains 
positive. In states with closed lists, the use of a simple gender quota increases the predicted 
probability that women will have experience as a former MP by about 4% and placement mandates 
increase this by about another 7% (11.5% overall). In states with open lists, the marginal effect is 
slightly larger and the baseline probability is higher. Here, gender quotas increase the likelihood a 
female MEP will have held national legislative office by about 12% and placement mandates 
increase this by about 23 (or an additional 11%)%. Overall, this means that women in the EP are less 
likely to have held national office in closed list systems without quotas (about 5%) and more likely to 
have this experience in state with open lists and placement mandates (about 60%). This demonstrates 
the positive impact that electoral institutions can have in creating equal access to all political 
positions for women at the national level. The high correlation of the probability of being a former 
MP and working in the EP for women in these states is likely the result of having fewer barriers to 
entry in national politics and is representative of political institutions where cross-institutional 
careers are possible. We also controlled for several social factors that may influence the overall 
gender equality present in some societies, across the EU member states, as we consider this to be 
plausibly endogenous to our causal story. However, we find that these factors do not have consistent 
effects across our models. For example, the number of women in national parliaments has a positive 
and significant effect on the likelihood that male MEPs have previous local political experience, but 
it does not significantly affect the career trajectories of female MEPs. In addition, a country’s general 
level of gender equality decreases the likelihood that male MEPs will have held local elected office 
(at the 90% significance level), but it does not have any other effect. Each of these results generally 
suggests that, as gender equality increases differences associated with gender and political expertise 
are diminished.xi 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have taken up the important problem of women’s descriptive representation in 
legislative politics and examined the effect of national- and party-level gender quotas and placement 
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mandates for the election of quality candidates to the European Parliament. As an international 
legislature that places a premium on its intra-institutional diversity, the EP represents an important 
venue for testing the varied electoral systems at play in Europe, with respect to women’s 
representation. In keeping with the broader findings of the literature, we assumed that the presence of 
gender quotas and placement mandates would not only be useful to the promotion of female 
candidates to the EP, but that it might also come with an added benefit of improving the quality of all 
MEPs, through the recruitment of candidates that possess both the previous political experience, as 
well as professional and educational criteria that might improve the effectiveness of their service in 
the EP.  
 In keeping with our expectations, we were able to identify that the association between such 
institutional choices and representative backgrounds does indeed have a gendered nature to it. More 
specifically, we found that national quotas can reduce differences between MEP gender and 
background qualities and that placement mandates are even more effective at erasing differences 
between male and female MEPs, in terms of their prior experience. This finding suggests that quotas 
may remove some barriers to entry that women typically face when deciding to run for office, help to 
promote women with prior political experience to further positions, and also raise the number of 
politically experienced representatives at the European level. While previous research has also found 
the important role of placement mandates in the election of women (Jones 2004; Schmidt 2009; 
Schwindt‐Bayer 2009), we show that this is also an effective tool for eliminating differences between 
men and women’s prior experience when entering a legislature.  
 We were also able to identify some areas in which national rules for female recruitment 
might actually lead to more experienced and quality representatives, across both genders. Our results 
indicate that national-level quota and placement rules are positively associated with higher overall 
number of MEPs with doctoral degrees, as well as those with valuable professional backgrounds in 
law, economics and finance, and international affairs and diplomacy. National quotas are also 
correlated with the presence of more MEPs with a former national MP background. This provides 
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ample evidence that quotas can impact the overall composition of a legislature and supports our 
hypotheses that countries and parties that use gender quotas are more likely to have experienced 
MEPs. It also suggests that the use of quotas co-vary with a heightened number of overall MEPs 
whose experience is especially suited for the unique needs of the EP.  
 In sum, our findings reveal that the EP is a suitable laboratory to examine the effect of 
diverse electoral laws focused on women’s numerical and descriptive representation. We also add to 
the debate on the impact of electoral laws on women’s representation by assessing whether or not 
some laws may also come with the added value (or perhaps detriment) of the quality of 
representation on offer. Our findings suggest that while gendered differences in political and 
professional experience do exist in the European Parliament, gender quotas and placement mandates 
may somewhat abate these differences. Future work can continue to assess the role of party-level 
rules, as well as to problematize how such institutional innovations may impact on the career 
trajectories of female politicians across the multiple levels of office available within the EU. In 
addition, it’s worth noting that our research could also be extended to ensuring other kinds of diverse 
descriptive representation. While gender quotas are perhaps the most pervasive institutional 
innovation in the EU, other systems – such as reserved seats for ethnic or religious minorities, as well 
as recruitment mechanisms to boost numbers of other forms of minority representation – can and do 
exists in various international contexts. While beyond the scope of this particular project, future work 
should continue to examine how institutional innovations can enhance the quality of representation 
via the recruitment, selection, and election of additional diverse dimensions.  
i Of course, it’s worth pointing out that the grueling EP calendar, which typically meets two weeks per month in Brussels, one week per 
month in Strasbourg, and adjourns one week per month to work in home districts, may also be a particular disadvantage for women who 
attempt to balance private family life with public professional demands.  
ii Citation of the data source has been omitted in draft to preserve anonymity. Raw numbers for each category are available in Table S1.4 
of the Supplemental Materials.  
iii We also test whether party-level gender quotas affect the quality of representation. Results from these models are found in the 
supplementary appendix. The party level analyses generally support our hypotheses, but due to limitations on data availability at the 
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party level, we have chosen to focus our main discussion only on national-level rules. Data on gender quotas at the party level is taken in 
part from Brodolini et al. (2014) and (citation omitted).  In these models, we are also able to control for ideology at the party level using 
a series of party family variables  from the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Polk et al. 2017) 
iv Contextual data for European and National Elections comes from Egmond, et. al (2013) where it was calculated based on Gallagher 
(1991). Gallagher’s index for Croatia was calculated by the authors based on the 2011 national election with data from the European 
Election Database, available here: http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/country/croatia/ 
v These data are taken from the Eurostat Database measure “Tertiary education graduates” for 2012 and is available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/equality/data/database. 
vi This a measure of women in national legislatures in May 2014 from the database of the Inter-parliamentary Union. 
vii  We use the data from 2012 and the Index ranges from 0 to 100 with 100 being the most gender equality. The data can be accessed 
here https://data.europa.eu/euodp/data/dataset/gender-equality-index and it was downloaded on 11/19/2018. 
viii Tables A1.1 and A1.2 in the appendix report the complete logistic regression results for all of these plots. The supplementary 
materials also include models for additional categories of professional experience. 
ix Plots of predicted probabilities for male MEPs are available in figure A1.1 the supplementary materials. 
x All predicted probabilities reported in the paper are calculated holding all controls at their mean or median value and using the clarify 
function in Stata (Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2003). Coefficient plots were constructed using the Coef package (Jann 2014). 
xi These results are also robust to an array of alternative measures for societal gender equality, as discussed in the supplementary 
appendices. 
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Figure 1: Experience and National Gender Quotas 
 
The plots above display the coefficients and 95% confidence intervals of National Gender Quota for each dependent variable measuring 
experience. 
 
 
 
 Figure 2: Predicted Probabilities of Female MEPs and National Gender Quotas 
 
The plots above display the mean predicted probability and 95% confidence intervals for each dependent variable measuring given the level of 
quota. All remaining variables in model set to their mean with the exception of closed list which is set at its median. 
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Figure 3: Political Experience and Closed Ballot Effects 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Ballot Effects and Female MEPs as Former MPs 
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Table 1: Gender and Experience in the European Parliament 
  (1) Entire  Population1 (2) Quota Countries (3) Placement Countries 
    Women Men Both p Women Men Both p Women Men Both p 
  % of Full EP 36.70 63.30 100.00   11.57 21.68 33.24   8.91 13.70 22.61   
Political  National Party Office 5.32 14.49 19.81 0.01 1.86 5.72 7.58 0.07 1.86 4.52 5.98 0.18 
Experience Former MP 11.30 24.07 35.37 0.05 3.46 9.31 12.77 0.04 1.86 4.26 6.12 0.15 
 Former Local Politician 17.31 25.30 42.61 0.05 6.13 9.72 15.85 0.22 5.06 7.99 13.05 0.84 
  Incumbent 18.09 29.65 47.74 0.52 5.45 8.64 14.10 0.23 4.52 6.12 10.77 0.33 
Professional. Agriculture2 1.61 4.56 6.17 0.13 0.67 1.48 2.15 0.75 0.67 0.67 1.34 0.48 
Experience Legal 7.25 15.17 22.42 0.19 3.36 6.31 9.66 0.96 3.09 4.97 8.05 0.83 
 Medical 2.01 2.15 4.16 0.17 0.40 0.81 1.21 0.92 0.40 0.67 1.07 0.91 
 Economic and Finance 8.99 17.58 8.99 0.34 3.09 5.37 8.46 0.76 2.01 3.36 5.37 0.78 
 
Transportation and 
Telecom 
2.68 4.03 6.71 0.61 0.40 0.67 1.07 0.88 0.27 0.00 0.27 0.08 
 Teacher 5.64 14.50 20.13 0.01 2.28 6.17 8.46 0.13 1.48 4.03 5.50 0.06 
 International 8.59 17.05 25.64 0.30 2.95 6.31 9.26 0.53 2.15 3.36 5.50 0.95 
 PhD 5.91 13.42 19.33 0.09 1.34 5.91 7.25 0.00 0.94 3.09 4.03 0.03 
  Journalist 3.76 6.98 10.74 0.75 0.94 2.55 3.49 0.37 0.27 1.74 2.01 0.03 
Age Age ≥ 20 & < 30 0.80 1.33 2.13 0.09 0.00 0.13 0.13 0.46 0.00 0.13 0.13 0.42 
 Age ≥ 30 & < 40 5.85 7.45 13.30 0.10 1.60 1.99 3.59 0.03 1.46 1.60 3.06 0.38 
 Age ≥  40 & < 50 9.57 17.15 26.73 0.76 3.19 4.52 7.71 0.23 2.13 3.06 5.19 0.81 
 Age ≥ 50 & < 60 13.56 20.61 34.18 0.22 3.99 8.51 12.50 0.46 3.06 5.19 8.24 0.64 
 Age ≥ 60 & < 70 5.98 13.70 19.68 0.08 2.39 4.79 7.18 0.80 1.86 2.79 4.65 0.94 
 Age ≥ 70 & < 80 0.93 2.79 3.72 0.19 0.40 1.46 1.86 0.28 0.40 0.80 1.20 0.70 
 Age ≥ 80 0.00 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.00 0.27 0.27 0.30 0.00 0.13 0.13 0.42 
1 The subset of columns provides the percentage of women, men, and all MEPs that hold each category of experience, among all MEPs initially seated in 2014 
(1), the percentage of all women, men, and MEPs that hold each category of experience and that also come from Quota countries (2), and the percentage of all 
women, men, and MEPs that hold each category of experience and that also come from placement countries (3), respectively. Each p column provides the p 
value of a Χ2 test of association between genders for each category of experience, in each subgroup. Bold and underlined values indicate Χ2 values with 
significance ≥ 90%.  
2For all professional categories, N=745 and thus the percentage calculations for these experience categories use 745 as the denominator. Categories are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive. 
‘United in Diversity?’ 
 
 
33 
Appendix 
 
Table A1.1: Political Experience and National Gender Quotas 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES National Party Office Former MPs Local Politicians Incumbents 
 All Female  Male All Female Male All Female Male All Female Male 
National Gender Quota 0.328* 0.123 0.418** 0.298** 0.467*** 0.282* -0.036 -0.035 -0.013 -0.332** -0.087 -0.497*** 
 (0.196) (0.319) (0.168) (0.138) (0.136) (0.171) (0.121) (0.102) (0.161) (0.142) (0.159) (0.143) 
Closed List 0.059 0.320 -0.024 -0.957*** -1.769*** -0.674* 0.698*** 0.567*** 0.757*** 0.773*** 0.719*** 0.851*** 
 (0.321) (0.461) (0.373) (0.272) (0.235) (0.361) (0.197) (0.197) (0.262) (0.262) (0.272) (0.269) 
Disproportionality 0.089* 0.127 0.085 0.028 0.076 0.000 0.134*** 0.083 0.158*** 0.025 -0.033 0.055 
 (0.049) (0.091) (0.054) (0.057) (0.048) (0.080) (0.047) (0.052) (0.058) (0.052) (0.089) (0.053) 
# of Districts -0.074** -0.074 -0.086*** -0.092*** -0.158*** -0.073** 0.043* 0.018 0.058 -0.036 -0.102*** -0.006 
 (0.034) (0.063) (0.030) (0.029) (0.038) (0.032) (0.024) (0.020) (0.036) (0.024) (0.035) (0.022) 
% Women in Natl Parliament -0.005 0.013 -0.008 -0.027 0.000 -0.042 0.087*** 0.064*** 0.100*** 0.002 -0.040 0.021 
 (0.021) (0.037) (0.024) (0.020) (0.019) (0.028) (0.021) (0.017) (0.031) (0.019) (0.026) (0.018) 
% Women with degree 0.005 -0.007 0.010 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.032*** -0.001 0.001 -0.003 0.006 0.006 0.007 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) 
Gender Equality Index -0.034 -0.043 -0.027 0.010 -0.031 0.031 -0.036* -0.030 -0.047* 0.033 0.039 0.033 
 (0.021) (0.037) (0.020) (0.025) (0.029) (0.033) (0.019) (0.024) (0.027) (0.022) (0.030) (0.021) 
Age 0.024** 0.041* 0.015 0.044*** 0.054*** 0.042*** 0.022*** 0.047*** 0.011 0.053*** 0.057*** 0.055*** 
 (0.011) (0.023) (0.013) (0.008) (0.015) (0.011) (0.008) (0.012) (0.010) (0.006) (0.012) (0.009) 
Constant -1.581 -1.257 -1.990 -7.120*** -5.764** -7.867*** -2.829** -3.365* -2.082 -5.998*** -4.771** -7.119*** 
 (2.034) (2.956) (2.450) (2.260) (2.833) (2.672) (1.225) (1.903) (1.784) (1.864) (2.079) (2.056) 
Observations 752 276 476 752 276 476 751 275 476 752 276 476 
Pseudo R2 0.0469 0.0517 0.0532 0.172 0.254 0.145 0.0657 0.0695 0.0747 0.0831 0.0880 0.0976 
Wald Χ2 (12) 34.13 11.55 33.04 85.97 181.3 47.97 63.20 35.46 34.06 130.5 41.55 89.66 
Prob > Χ2  0.000 0.172 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors clustered on 28 countries in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table A1.2: Professional Experience and National Gender Quotas 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Legal  Economics and Finance International Affairs PhD 
VARIABLES All Female Male All Female Male All Female Male All Female Male 
National Gender Quota 0.439*** 0.757*** 0.305*** -0.088 0.063 -0.159*** 0.341*** 0.288* 0.375*** 0.226 -0.223 0.433** 
 (0.075) (0.167) (0.085) (0.072) (0.131) (0.056) (0.103) (0.159) (0.137) (0.160) (0.144) (0.216) 
Closed List 0.189 -0.003 0.309 0.230 -0.284 0.464** -0.616** -0.434 -0.757*** -0.040 0.093 -0.077 
 (0.196) (0.324) (0.241) (0.161) (0.287) (0.183) (0.245) (0.356) (0.289) (0.292) (0.415) (0.339) 
Disproportionality -0.040 -0.153** 0.013 -0.014 0.039 -0.040 0.020 0.060 0.001 -0.100* -0.043 -0.125** 
 (0.033) (0.070) (0.051) (0.029) (0.047) (0.036) (0.056) (0.071) (0.059) (0.053) (0.089) (0.060) 
# of Districts -0.021 -0.050 -0.006 -0.001 0.018 -0.004 -0.116*** -0.072** -0.130*** -0.050 -0.043 -0.065 
 (0.023) (0.050) (0.030) (0.021) (0.043) (0.019) (0.032) (0.036) (0.037) (0.034) (0.040) (0.042) 
% Women in Natl Parliament -0.018 -0.093*** 0.021 -0.010 0.004 -0.014 -0.048* -0.011 -0.069** -0.040 -0.025 -0.049 
 (0.019) (0.035) (0.027) (0.016) (0.024) (0.017) (0.027) (0.036) (0.031) (0.025) (0.035) (0.035) 
% Women with degree -0.009 -0.005 -0.010 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.015** 0.023*** 0.010 0.010 0.004 0.014 
 (0.006) (0.009) (0.008) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
Gender Equality Index -0.007 0.036 -0.029 0.007 -0.002 0.014 0.043 0.033 0.051 0.014 -0.015 0.035 
 (0.018) (0.041) (0.021) (0.020) (0.031) (0.020) (0.034) (0.036) (0.038) (0.032) (0.033) (0.043) 
Age -0.021** -0.002 -0.031*** -0.002 -0.013 0.003 0.023*** 0.012 0.026*** 0.012 0.017 0.009 
 (0.010) (0.019) (0.010) (0.008) (0.014) (0.008) (0.009) (0.020) (0.007) (0.008) (0.020) (0.009) 
Constant 2.080 0.392 2.773 -1.724 -1.105 -2.245* -5.484** -7.043*** -4.470* -2.719 -0.983 -3.961 
 (1.647) (3.051) (1.815) (1.478) (2.519) (1.337) (2.274) (2.645) (2.522) (2.283) (2.295) (2.990) 
Observations 745 273 472 745 273 472 745 273 472 745 273 472 
Pseudo R2 0.0402 0.0821 0.0456 0.00426 0.00987 0.0134 0.0664 0.0702 0.0738 0.0325 0.0343 0.0431 
Wald Χ2 (12) 166.6 30.34 92.59 9.478 4.320 46.49 53.73 29.58 47.80 31.49 11.89 18.23 
Prob > Χ2  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.304 0.827 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.156 0.020 
Standard errors clustered on 28 countries in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure A1.1 Predicted Probabilities of Male MEPs and Experience 
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Table S1.1 All MEPs and Additional Professional Experience 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Agriculture Med Transportation  
and Telecom 
Teacher Journalist 
      
National Gender Quota -0.097 0.047 -0.867*** 0.307*** 0.154 
 (0.169) (0.222) (0.225) (0.070) (0.101) 
Closed List 0.172 -0.219 0.322 0.710*** -0.980*** 
 (0.480) (0.442) (0.378) (0.113) (0.224) 
Disproportionality -0.089 0.074 -0.008 -0.021 0.022 
 (0.119) (0.064) (0.108) (0.038) (0.061) 
# of Districts 0.042 -0.013 -0.022 -0.067*** -0.084*** 
 (0.044) (0.033) (0.044) (0.019) (0.024) 
% Women in Natl Parliament 0.017 -0.013 0.027 -0.024*** 0.009 
 (0.023) (0.033) (0.024) (0.009) (0.018) 
% Women with degree 0.001 -0.009 0.000 0.017*** 0.004 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.003) (0.005) 
% Regular Service Attendance -0.003 0.016 0.008 0.009* 0.007 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.006) (0.009) 
Age 0.033** 0.000 0.011 0.021*** 0.029*** 
 (0.014) (0.017) (0.012) (0.008) (0.010) 
Constant -4.747* -2.330 -4.012* -4.850*** -4.267*** 
 (2.852) (2.283) (2.318) (0.744) (1.463) 
      
Observations 745 745 745 745 745 
Pseudo R2 0.0260 0.0189 0.0437 0.0658 0.0592 
Wald Χ2 (12) 13.79 6.377 30.60 140 102.1 
Prob > Χ2  0.0874 0.605 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors clustered on 28 parties in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table S1.2 Female MEPs and Additional Professional Experience 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Agriculture Med Transportation  
and Telecom 
Teacher Journalist 
      
National Gender Quota 1.097** -0.158 -0.547*** 0.251* 0.266 
 (0.438) (0.374) (0.195) (0.130) (0.207) 
Closed List -0.656 -0.677 0.079 0.420 -2.651*** 
 (0.574) (0.852) (0.415) (0.381) (0.515) 
Disproportionality -0.281 0.083 0.055 0.004 0.011 
 (0.176) (0.091) (0.097) (0.071) (0.101) 
# of Districts -0.489* -0.001 -0.170*** -0.038 -0.139** 
 (0.290) (0.066) (0.039) (0.025) (0.057) 
% Women in Natl Parliament -0.080 0.006 -0.009 -0.027 0.008 
 (0.064) (0.053) (0.032) (0.022) (0.031) 
% Women with degree -0.043** -0.009 -0.020* 0.014*** 0.008 
 (0.021) (0.010) (0.012) (0.005) (0.010) 
% Regular Service Attendance -0.152*** 0.012 -0.006 0.020* 0.017 
 (0.055) (0.019) (0.015) (0.012) (0.015) 
Age 0.073** 0.015 -0.004 0.020 0.031 
 (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.014) (0.022) 
Constant 7.092 -2.953 1.385 -4.915** -4.810* 
 (5.446) (3.049) (3.006) (2.031) (2.558) 
      
Observations 273 273 273 273 273 
Pseudo R2 0.209 0.0326 0.0680 0.0657 0.179 
Wald Χ2 (12) 793.6 4.905 139.1 52.59 45.73 
Prob > Χ2  0.000 0.768 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors clustered on 28 parties in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table S1.3 Male MEPs and Additional Professional Experience 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Agriculture Med Transportation  
and Telecom 
Teacher Journalist Agriculture 
       
National Gender Quota -0.312 0.299 -0.192*** -1.250*** 0.350*** 0.176 
 (0.333) (0.302) (0.068) (0.348) (0.091) (0.136) 
Closed List 0.188 0.099 0.567*** 0.470 0.874*** -0.486 
 (0.684) (0.609) (0.156) (0.507) (0.187) (0.297) 
Disproportionality -0.027 0.061 -0.013 -0.100 -0.030 0.019 
 (0.154) (0.101) (0.042) (0.175) (0.051) (0.066) 
# of Districts 0.062 -0.016 -0.003 0.054 -0.074*** -0.066** 
 (0.050) (0.038) (0.012) (0.054) (0.026) (0.026) 
% Women in Natl Parliament 0.012 -0.039 -0.003 0.040 -0.017** 0.011 
 (0.027) (0.033) (0.013) (0.027) (0.008) (0.025) 
% Women with degree -0.001 -0.009 0.004 0.014 0.020*** 0.003 
 (0.012) (0.009) (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) 
% Regular Service Attendance 0.006 0.021 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.002 
 (0.017) (0.015) (0.006) (0.019) (0.008) (0.010) 
Age 0.024 -0.008 0.003 0.021* 0.020* 0.029** 
 (0.017) (0.015) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Constant -4.300 -1.727 -1.861** -6.535** -5.241*** -4.277** 
 (3.746) (2.693) (0.942) (2.785) (1.017) (1.980) 
       
Observations 472 472 472 472 472 472 
Pseudo R2 0.0248 0.0310 0.0131 0.0735 0.0735 0.0333 
Wald Χ2 (12) 9.661 14.20 42.18 30.63 140.3 56.60 
Prob > Χ2  0.290 0.0766 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors clustered on 28 parties in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table S1.4 Gender and Experience in the European Parliament 
 
    Entire  Population Quota Countries Placement Countries 
    Women Men All p Women Men All p Women Men All p 
  Gender 276 476 752   87 163 250   67 103 170   
Political  National Party Office 40 109 149 0.005 14 43 57 0.065 14 34 48 0.184 
Office Former MP 85 181 266 0.046 26 70 96 0.043 14 32 46 0.145 
 Former Local Politician 130 190 320 0.050 46 73 119 0.223 38 60 
98 0.843 
  Incumbent 136 223 359 0.521 41 65 106 0.269 34 46 80 0.334 
Professional. Agriculture1 12 34 46 0.125 5 11 16 0.749 5 5 10 0.48 
Experience Legal 54 113 167 0.190 25 47 72 0.963 23 37 60 0.832 
 Medical 15 16 31 0.166 3 6 9 0.918 3 5 8 0.91 
 Economic and Finance 67 131 67 0.339 23 40 63 0.763 15 25 40 0.777 
 Transportation and Telecom 20 30 50 0.610 3 5 8 0.877 2 0 2 0.078 
 Teacher 42 108 150 0.014 17 46 63 0.125 11 30 41 0.058 
 International 64 127 191 0.297 22 47 69 0.531 16 25 41 0.954 
 PhD 44 100 144 0.091 10 44 54 0.004 7 23 30 0.047 
  Journalist 28 52 80 0.747 7 19 26 0.365 2 13 15 0.03 
Age Age ≥ 20 & < 30 6 10 16 0.095 0 1 1 0.464 0 1 1 0.419 
 Age ≥ 30 & < 40 44 56 100 0.104 12 15 27 0.0265 11 12 23 0.375 
 Age ≥  40 & < 50 72 129 201 0.762 24 34 58 0.23 16 23 39 0.814 
 Age ≥ 50 & < 60 102 155 257 0.221 30 64 94 0.457 23 39 62 0.64 
 Age ≥ 60 & < 70 45 103 148 0.076 18 36 54 0.798 14 21 35 0.94 
 Age ≥ 70 & < 80 7 21 28 0.190 3 11 14 0.28 3 6 9 0.701 
 Age ≥ 80 0 2 2 0.281 0 2 2 0.3 0 1 1 0.419 
 Age < 40 50 66 116 0.120 12 16 28 0.342 11 13 24 0.487 
  Age > 60 52 126 178 0.018 21 49 70 0.32 17 28 45 0.0794 
 N of Gender Group 276 476   90 169 
 
 70 107 
 
 
  N of  Experience Subgroup 752 752     259 259     177 177     
1For all professional categories, N=745 and thus the percentage calculations for these experience categories use 745 as the denominator.  
Categories are not necessarily mutually exclusive. 
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2. Party level Analysis 
 
In addition to analysis conducted at the national level, we also chose to investigate the relationship between 
gender quotas at the party level and MEP experience. At the party level, we are able to account for voluntary 
gender quotas and placement mandates, in addition to national gender requirements.  These are quotas in 
parties where there is no national law on gender quotas or in parties that have rules that go above and beyond 
the national law. Data on gender quotas at the party level is taken in part from Brodolini et al. (2014), which 
provides data for parties that were serving in the EP and had registered electoral lists for the European 
Election of 2014, as of May 2014.  This was supplemented, when necessary, by the Quota Project, which 
includes data on all parties serving in the national parliaments of EU member states. Parties that serve in the 
EP are excluded from this data if we were unable to confirm either the presence of a quota or its absence. In 
addition, the control variables listed above, we are also able to control for ideology at the party level. We do 
this with a series of party family variables. These include radical right, conservative, liberal, Christian 
democrat, socialist, radical left, and green parties. These data come from the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey  
(Polk et al. 2017). 
Tables S2.1 and S2.2 report the results of similar logistic regression models to those analyzed in text 
with a smaller subset of MEPs and also including party-level data for political experience professional 
experience. The results reported below largely confirm the conclusions of the text but have less power given 
the availability of the data at the party level. Party Gender quotes, while not increase the likelihood that 
female MEPs will have been national MPS, decrease the likelihood that Male MEPs will have this type of 
experience. National gender quotas again increase the likelihood that male MEPs will have held national 
party office and decrease the likelihood that they will be incumbents. Table S2.2 shows that party quotas 
little effect on the type professionally experience MEPs serve in the EP. This table shows that national quotas 
are much more important in influencing the type of MEP representing each party and country. 
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Table S2.1 Professional Experience and Party Gender Quotas 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Incumbents VARIABLES  National Party Office Former MPs Local Politicians 
  All Female Male All Female Male All Female Male All Female Male 
Party Gender Quota  0.332 0.324 0.240 -0.547*** -0.502 -0.657*** -0.062 -0.100 -0.096 -0.449 -0.279 -0.473 
  (0.318) (0.363) (0.372) (0.205) (0.527) (0.223) (0.242) (0.309) (0.264) (0.298) (0.326) (0.384) 
National Gender Quota  0.458*** 0.203 0.441** -0.038 0.057 0.065 0.173 -0.149 0.382** -0.466** -0.088 -0.619** 
  (0.153) (0.396) (0.179) (0.150) (0.227) (0.216) (0.170) (0.265) (0.174) (0.206) (0.294) (0.255) 
Closed List  -0.868* -0.320 -1.085** -0.222 -1.512*** 0.443 0.581* 0.197 0.899** 1.519*** 1.056* 1.895*** 
  (0.498) (0.850) (0.479) (0.273) (0.402) (0.388) (0.300) (0.518) (0.402) (0.500) (0.562) (0.678) 
Disproportionality  0.037 0.027 0.096 0.152*** 0.182*** 0.143* 0.108 0.037 0.149* 0.017 -0.137 0.082 
  (0.066) (0.150) (0.074) (0.047) (0.050) (0.086) (0.076) (0.097) (0.088) (0.085) (0.143) (0.090) 
# of Districts  -0.148*** -0.195** -0.146*** -0.136*** -0.148** -0.143*** -0.018 -0.018 -0.036 -0.064* -0.106** -0.049 
  (0.039) (0.089) (0.041) (0.024) (0.070) (0.035) (0.030) (0.042) (0.034) (0.037) (0.044) (0.051) 
Women in Natl Parliament  -0.042 0.035 -0.049 0.029* 0.001 0.034 0.073*** 0.059* 0.085*** 0.045* -0.035 0.072** 
  (0.027) (0.059) (0.030) (0.017) (0.032) (0.027) (0.021) (0.033) (0.025) (0.026) (0.037) (0.033) 
Women with Degree  0.003 -0.003 0.008 0.043*** 0.047*** 0.044*** 0.004 -0.000 0.007 0.005 0.002 0.005 
  (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.006) (0.012) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006) 
Religiosity  0.002 0.009 0.003 0.022*** 0.017 0.028** 0.002 0.005 0.005 0.003 -0.022 0.010 
  (0.007) (0.026) (0.009) (0.007) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.017) (0.012) (0.014) (0.017) (0.016) 
Age  0.039** 0.055 0.030* 0.058*** 0.071*** 0.058*** 0.016** 0.049*** 0.003 0.056*** 0.040* 0.070*** 
  (0.015) (0.037) (0.017) (0.010) (0.027) (0.013) (0.007) (0.013) (0.009) (0.011) (0.023) (0.016) 
Radical Right  0.350 1.396 0.209 -0.596 -1.926 -0.400 0.665 1.568 0.445 -1.375 -3.741** -1.008 
  (0.679) (1.378) (0.700) (0.381) (1.746) (0.421) (0.921) (1.489) (0.915) (0.908) (1.598) (0.888) 
Conservative  -1.165  -0.860 -1.341*** -1.600 -1.182* 0.418 0.237 0.515 -0.136 -1.172 0.015 
  (0.774)  (0.759) (0.496) (1.810) (0.674) (0.795) (1.391) (0.800) (0.865) (1.454) (0.919) 
Liberal  0.093 -0.829 0.634 -0.687 0.205 -1.321* 0.184 0.008 0.003 -0.417 -1.449 -0.140 
  (0.749) (1.582) (0.664) (0.617) (1.307) (0.690) (0.897) (1.592) (0.823) (0.794) (1.462) (0.847) 
Christian Democrat  -1.505** -1.548 -1.442* -0.918* -1.793 -0.674 0.717 0.522 0.649 0.066 0.431 -0.194 
  (0.721) (1.911) (0.738) (0.535) (1.552) (0.556) (0.929) (1.546) (0.855) (0.778) (1.525) (0.803) 
Socialist  -0.498 -1.125 0.021 -0.771 -0.082 -1.201* 0.455 0.139 0.477 -0.644 -1.378 -0.607 
  (0.647) (1.645) (0.650) (0.558) (1.557) (0.647) (0.776) (1.417) (0.626) (0.910) (1.600) (0.861) 
Radical Left  -0.290  0.381 -1.975** -1.034 -2.405** 0.652  -0.498 -0.184 -1.127 -0.019 
  (0.750)  (0.693) (0.978) (1.610) (0.998) (0.908)  (1.004) (0.796) (1.760) (0.798) 
Green  -1.326 -1.988 -1.127 -1.407** -0.447 -1.682** -0.286 -0.411 -0.398 0.604 -0.437 0.918 
  (0.991) (1.537) (1.186) (0.550) (1.722) (0.779) (0.865) (1.324) (0.955) (0.905) (1.540) (1.088) 
Constant  -1.924 -4.300 -2.393 -10.504*** -10.704*** -11.000*** -4.875*** -4.689** -5.536*** -4.493** 1.661 -6.789** 
  (2.124) (4.013) (2.361) (1.501) (2.336) (2.144) (1.395) (2.370) (2.080) (2.165) (2.847) (2.812) 
              
Observations  410 126 260 410 150 260 409 143 260 410 150 260 
Pseudo R2  0.126 0.145 0.169 0.266 0.377 0.263 0.0738 0.0896 0.0925 0.152 0.210 0.174 
Wald Χ2 (12)  124.7 129.9 126.1 487.1 419.8 235.3 87.92 54.06 127.1 195.7 151.7 156.6 
Prob > Χ2   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Country clustered standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table S2.2 Professional Experience and Party Gender Quotas  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Legal Economics and Finance International PhD 
 All Female Male All Female Male All Female Male All Female Male 
Party Gender Quota 0.168 -0.049 0.298 0.025 -0.268 0.182 0.259 0.030 0.469 0.289 -0.396 0.643* 
 (0.200) (0.365) (0.287) (0.174) (0.326) (0.207) (0.241) (0.470) (0.335) (0.259) (0.363) (0.385) 
National Gender Quota 0.186 0.685* 0.017 0.115 -0.033 0.212** 0.095 -0.002 0.143 0.112 -0.698** 0.526*** 
 (0.159) (0.374) (0.185) (0.090) (0.293) (0.107) (0.213) (0.268) (0.247) (0.148) (0.275) (0.185) 
Closed List -0.379 -0.720 -0.303 0.419*** 0.249 0.468* -0.790** -0.873 -0.690 0.509* 1.070* 0.114 
 (0.407) (0.696) (0.523) (0.162) (0.521) (0.266) (0.361) (0.650) (0.543) (0.279) (0.632) (0.365) 
Disproportionality -0.065 -0.221* 0.007 0.040 0.141* -0.012 0.040 -0.046 0.139 -0.054 -0.053 -0.058 
 (0.076) (0.119) (0.107) (0.042) (0.080) (0.064) (0.054) (0.061) (0.087) (0.060) (0.124) (0.079) 
# of Districts 0.014 -0.003 0.021 -0.022 -0.021 -0.012 -0.064** -0.029 -0.096 -0.100*** -0.174** -0.086 
 (0.025) (0.041) (0.041) (0.021) (0.040) (0.028) (0.032) (0.044) (0.059) (0.038) (0.073) (0.056) 
Women in Natl Parliament -0.040 -0.128*** -0.014 -0.003 0.012 -0.013 -0.033 -0.030 -0.036 -0.015 -0.020 -0.023 
 (0.025) (0.047) (0.033) (0.013) (0.032) (0.017) (0.021) (0.036) (0.026) (0.016) (0.035) (0.023) 
Women with Degree -0.006 -0.002 -0.009 0.005 0.006 0.003 0.015** 0.019** 0.012 0.021*** 0.015* 0.023** 
 (0.008) (0.012) (0.010) (0.004) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) 
Religiosity -0.014 -0.033 -0.007 0.003 0.008 0.001 -0.002 -0.024* 0.013 0.011 0.012 0.009 
 (0.011) (0.024) (0.017) (0.006) (0.016) (0.007) (0.009) (0.013) (0.015) (0.009) (0.021) (0.012) 
Age -0.033*** -0.038 -0.030** -0.001 -0.013 0.005 0.019 0.007 0.019 0.025* 0.071** 0.010 
 (0.011) (0.026) (0.012) (0.011) (0.022) (0.013) (0.016) (0.036) (0.017) (0.014) (0.029) (0.018) 
Radical Right -0.210 -2.978** 0.324 0.331 -0.551 0.143 0.215 -1.470 0.631 1.316 1.344* 0.769 
 (0.527) (1.491) (0.742) (0.379) (0.871) (0.507) (0.782) (1.502) (0.944) (0.936) (0.766) (1.069) 
Conservative -0.659 -3.726* -0.042 0.608  0.194 0.038 -1.055 0.204 1.100  0.866 
 (0.454) (2.086) (0.569) (0.442)  (0.471) (0.835) (1.338) (0.973) (0.828)  (0.917) 
Liberal -0.514 -3.437** 0.365 0.434 0.105 -0.103 1.478** 0.236 1.785* 0.481 -1.459 0.642 
 (0.486) (1.750) (0.704) (0.598) (0.766) (0.657) (0.744) (1.094) (0.960) (0.863) (1.072) (0.969) 
Christian Democrat 0.083 -1.833 0.414 0.604 -0.727 0.431 1.238* 0.685 1.331 0.737 0.248 0.278 
 (0.364) (1.758) (0.571) (0.471) (0.686) (0.501) (0.742) (1.065) (0.986) (0.845) (0.815) (0.928) 
Socialist -0.951** -2.938* -0.385 0.508 -0.167 0.298 0.296 -0.427 0.305 -0.143 -1.353 -0.182 
 (0.445) (1.704) (0.457) (0.462) (0.521) (0.473) (0.679) (1.241) (0.992) (0.843) (0.852) (0.885) 
Radical Left -0.793 -2.657 -0.334 -0.165 -0.963 -0.400 0.052  0.524 0.277 0.648 -0.926 
 (0.636) (1.794) (0.814) (0.571) (1.062) (0.649) (0.846)  (1.012) (1.009) (1.043) (1.317) 
Green -1.362*** -3.408** -0.930 -0.716 -1.125 -1.155* 0.252 -0.162 -0.291 0.671 0.158 -0.146 
 (0.502) (1.605) (0.649) (0.654) (0.778) (0.622) (0.850) (1.287) (1.033) (0.894) (0.832) (0.981) 
Constant 3.479 9.274** 1.952 -2.280** -2.153 -1.571 -3.652* -1.642 -4.462* -6.096*** -6.358* -5.284** 
 (2.205) (3.996) (2.545) (1.070) (2.180) (1.526) (1.927) (2.523) (2.520) (1.851) (3.292) (2.109) 
             
Observations 406 148 258 406 148 258 406 142 258 406 148 258 
Pseudo R2 0.0471 0.152 0.0421 0.0249 0.0521 0.0393 0.113 0.133 0.131 0.0873 0.184 0.106 
Wald Χ2 (12) 47.51 52.14 55.52 158.2 73.52 90.64 172.9 170.1 105.7 127.7 249.6 101.5 
Prob > Χ2  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Country clustered standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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3. Robustness check of alternative measures 
 
In order to check the robustness of our analysis we used a series of alternation measure for our control variables. 
Recall that main analysis seeks to control for overall levels of gender equality in society using a measure of women’s 
tertiary education as a percentage of men’s education and religiosity as a the percentage of people attending church 
services once per month or more as answered by respondents to the European Values Survey (EVS 2015; WVS 
2015).  This is the percentage of respondents that answered answer to “Do you belong to a religious denomination?” 
which is variable V105 in the EVS. In terms of gender equality, we also tested the gap in the employment rate 
between men and women aged 20-64 and the gap in hourly wages between men and women as a percentage of 
average gross hourly earnings of men. These data are available from Eurostat at the following address: 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/equality/data/database. As the models below show, these alternative analyses 
confirm the conclusions of the paper and provided evidence in support H1 and H2.  
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Table S3.1: Political Experience and National Gender Quotas: Pay Gap Control for Equality 
VARIABLES National Party Office Former MPs Local Politicians Incumbents 
 All Female Male All Female Male All Female Male All Female Male 
National Gender Quota 0.329 0.098 0.405** 0.245 0.508** 0.168 0.011 0.193 -0.071 -0.414** -0.132 -0.589*** 
 (0.207) (0.345) (0.195) (0.238) (0.203) (0.293) (0.176) (0.152) (0.212) (0.207) (0.256) (0.206) 
Closed List -0.079 0.370 -0.160 -1.255*** -2.399*** -0.712 0.565** 0.047 0.843** 0.888** 0.683 0.965*** 
 (0.359) (0.630) (0.389) (0.421) (0.415) (0.461) (0.251) (0.208) (0.340) (0.357) (0.453) (0.355) 
Disproportionality 0.065 0.082 0.079 0.026 -0.012 0.062 0.091 0.010 0.126 0.062 -0.017 0.087 
 (0.056) (0.103) (0.068) (0.076) (0.060) (0.102) (0.059) (0.043) (0.079) (0.063) (0.109) (0.067) 
Districts -0.094** -0.095 -0.107*** -0.082* -0.118* -0.075* 0.026 0.013 0.033 -0.023 -0.079** 0.009 
 (0.041) (0.066) (0.040) (0.049) (0.066) (0.045) (0.023) (0.023) (0.027) (0.022) (0.036) (0.022) 
Women in Natl Parl -0.030 -0.020 -0.029 -0.034 -0.044** -0.029 0.057*** 0.029** 0.070*** 0.025 -0.019 0.041** 
 (0.018) (0.032) (0.019) (0.026) (0.022) (0.032) (0.018) (0.014) (0.024) (0.020) (0.030) (0.019) 
Gender Pay Gap -0.016 -0.040 -0.006 -0.018 -0.011 -0.020 -0.003 0.058** -0.040 -0.017 -0.009 -0.027 
 (0.026) (0.059) (0.025) (0.034) (0.037) (0.041) (0.030) (0.026) (0.037) (0.029) (0.041) (0.030) 
Religiosity 0.000 -0.014 0.008 0.011 -0.005 0.021* -0.002 0.001 -0.004 -0.000 -0.005 -0.002 
 (0.010) (0.018) (0.010) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008) 
Age 0.024** 0.038 0.016 0.045*** 0.053*** 0.043*** 0.021*** 0.045*** 0.013 0.054*** 0.058*** 0.056*** 
 (0.011) (0.024) (0.012) (0.007) (0.014) (0.010) (0.008) (0.011) (0.010) (0.006) (0.012) (0.009) 
Constant -1.799 -2.565 -1.612 -1.483 -0.679 -2.098 -3.902*** -4.422*** -3.616** -3.821*** -1.988 -4.457*** 
 (1.126) (2.152) (1.218) (1.349) (1.045) (1.601) (1.001) (0.893) (1.453) (1.012) (1.574) (1.030) 
             
Observations 752 276 476 752 276 476 751 275 476 752 276 476 
Pseudo R2 0.0417 0.0513 0.0461 0.128 0.196 0.115 0.0617 0.0753 0.0727 0.0802 0.0830 0.0959 
Wald Χ2 (12) 38.34 8.832 20.33 59.53 65.59 28.88 58.22 68.63 40.36 169.2 40.99 146.4 
Prob > Χ2  0.000 0.357 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors clustered on 28 countries in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table S3.2: Professional Experience and National Gender Quotas: Pay Gap Control for Equality 
VARIABLES Legal Economics and Finance International Affairs PhD 
 All Female Male All Female Male All Female Male All Female Male 
National Gender Quota 0.451*** 0.704*** 0.365*** -0.041 0.226 -0.160 0.252 0.253 0.254 0.426** -0.023 0.627*** 
 (0.117) (0.182) (0.133) (0.111) (0.172) (0.099) (0.192) (0.242) (0.204) (0.187) (0.242) (0.242) 
Closed List 0.266 -0.007 0.330 0.099 -0.657* 0.446*** -0.832** -1.145** -0.638** -0.581* -0.319 -0.659* 
 (0.220) (0.364) (0.271) (0.188) (0.343) (0.170) (0.331) (0.513) (0.324) (0.303) (0.456) (0.357) 
Disproportionality -0.043 -0.163** 0.007 -0.021 0.016 -0.026 0.004 -0.048 0.044 -0.196** -0.112 -0.233** 
 (0.043) (0.079) (0.053) (0.042) (0.074) (0.043) (0.055) (0.083) (0.058) (0.077) (0.131) (0.091) 
Districts -0.021 -0.020 -0.026* 0.002 0.027 -0.002 -0.077** -0.027 -0.106*** -0.015 -0.040 -0.007 
 (0.014) (0.038) (0.015) (0.016) (0.034) (0.012) (0.039) (0.062) (0.037) (0.040) (0.048) (0.046) 
Women in Natl Parl -0.018 -0.081*** 0.011 -0.010 0.000 -0.008 -0.040** -0.041 -0.040* -0.060*** -0.050 -0.064*** 
 (0.016) (0.021) (0.023) (0.013) (0.024) (0.014) (0.020) (0.028) (0.022) (0.017) (0.037) (0.024) 
Gender Pay Gap 0.002 -0.037 0.026 0.020 0.059* 0.007 -0.043 -0.065* -0.031 0.057** 0.063 0.057 
 (0.024) (0.036) (0.030) (0.019) (0.033) (0.019) (0.033) (0.038) (0.034) (0.025) (0.041) (0.038) 
Religiosity -0.004 -0.022 0.005 0.004 0.006 0.004 -0.017* -0.039** -0.003 -0.005 0.004 -0.009 
 (0.007) (0.016) (0.009) (0.004) (0.009) (0.006) (0.010) (0.017) (0.012) (0.007) (0.018) (0.010) 
Age -0.022** -0.002 -0.032*** -0.002 -0.014 0.002 0.026*** 0.018 0.028*** 0.010 0.016 0.006 
 (0.010) (0.018) (0.010) (0.008) (0.014) (0.008) (0.008) (0.019) (0.007) (0.008) (0.022) (0.008) 
Constant 0.363 2.771** -0.660 -0.923 -1.536 -1.083 0.331 1.910 -0.536 0.210 -1.186 0.855 
 (0.956) (1.259) (1.494) (0.743) (1.614) (0.780) (1.292) (2.119) (1.286) (0.979) (2.394) (1.204) 
             
Observations 745 273 472 745 273 472 745 273 472 745 273 472 
Pseudo R2 0.0371 0.0848 0.0430 0.00443 0.0181 0.0124 0.0599 0.0670 0.0679 0.0374 0.0426 0.0448 
Wald Χ2 (12) 98.96 84.11 140 10.92 6.848 38.76 47.79 39.46 52.32 45 15.63 13.39 
Prob > Χ2  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.206 0.553 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.0480 0.0990 
Standard errors clustered on 28 countries in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table S3.3: Political Experience and National Gender Quotas: Employment Gap Control for Equality 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES National Party Office Former MPs Local Politicians Incumbent 
 All  Female Male All  Female Male All Female Male All Female Male 
             
National Gender Quota 0.489** 0.347 0.529*** 0.427*** 0.642*** 0.376** 0.013 0.049 0.025 -0.301** -0.010 -0.460*** 
 (0.195) (0.323) (0.180) (0.150) (0.202) (0.157) (0.149) (0.121) (0.197) (0.138) (0.163) (0.148) 
Closed List -0.149 0.323 -0.229 -1.302*** -2.340*** -0.831*** 0.548** 0.298 0.642** 0.877*** 0.777** 0.887*** 
 (0.274) (0.534) (0.299) (0.270) (0.299) (0.289) (0.215) (0.262) (0.285) (0.314) (0.365) (0.322) 
Disproportionality 0.053 0.076 0.070 0.032 -0.003 0.060 0.091 0.018 0.117 0.061 -0.017 0.082 
 (0.044) (0.103) (0.059) (0.045) (0.054) (0.063) (0.056) (0.052) (0.074) (0.057) (0.089) (0.068) 
Districts -0.118*** -0.111 -0.130*** -0.131*** -0.159*** -0.126*** 0.027 0.010 0.033 -0.042** -0.102*** -0.010 
 (0.039) (0.071) (0.036) (0.024) (0.048) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.030) (0.018) (0.031) (0.019) 
Women in Natl Parliament -0.030* -0.016 -0.029* -0.030 -0.040* -0.025 0.057*** 0.029* 0.067*** 0.028* -0.016 0.043*** 
 (0.015) (0.029) (0.016) (0.020) (0.021) (0.024) (0.017) (0.017) (0.025) (0.015) (0.024) (0.015) 
Employment Gap -0.058** -0.088* -0.049** -0.094*** -0.066** -0.106*** 0.003 0.004 0.004 -0.052*** -0.066*** -0.048*** 
 (0.024) (0.049) (0.023) (0.018) (0.028) (0.018) (0.021) (0.018) (0.029) (0.017) (0.021) (0.016) 
Religiosity 0.011 0.009 0.015* 0.031*** 0.015* 0.039*** -0.002 -0.008 0.001 0.011 0.012 0.008 
 (0.008) (0.019) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.010) 
Age 0.023** 0.036 0.015 0.044*** 0.050*** 0.043*** 0.021*** 0.046*** 0.011 0.053*** 0.057*** 0.055*** 
 (0.011) (0.025) (0.012) (0.008) (0.014) (0.010) (0.007) (0.012) (0.010) (0.006) (0.012) (0.009) 
Constant -1.356 -2.669 -1.091 -1.017 -0.465 -1.440 -3.972*** -3.433*** -4.146** -3.657*** -1.707 -4.382*** 
 (0.987) (1.915) (1.228) (1.123) (0.971) (1.454) (1.194) (1.175) (1.681) (0.913) (1.450) (1.132) 
             
Observations 752 276 476 752 276 476 751 275 476 752 276 476 
Pseudo R2 0.0574 0.0746 0.0577 0.174 0.218 0.169 0.0617 0.0669 0.0688 0.0933 0.105 0.105 
Wald Χ2 (12) 18.58 5.144 24.83 102.6 96.78 151.9 67.98 48.04 40.83 291.5 66.33 206.8 
Prob > Χ2  0.0173 0.742 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors clustered on 28 countries in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table S3.4: Political Experience and National Gender Quotas: Employment Gap Control for Equality 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES legal Economics and Finance International PhD 
 All Female Male All Female Male All Female Male All Female Male 
             
National Gender Quota 0.380*** 0.723*** 0.243*** -0.043 0.141 -0.137** 0.453*** 0.578*** 0.380** 0.337** -0.204 0.615*** 
 (0.081) (0.188) (0.080) (0.061) (0.115) (0.060) (0.119) (0.125) (0.168) (0.164) (0.220) (0.217) 
Closed List 0.290 -0.156 0.461** 0.200 -0.323 0.468*** -0.947*** -1.197*** -0.744** -0.393 -0.148 -0.506 
 (0.181) (0.380) (0.232) (0.134) (0.286) (0.138) (0.262) (0.310) (0.310) (0.295) (0.508) (0.335) 
Disproportionality -0.038 -0.191** 0.022 -0.008 0.026 -0.021 -0.008 -0.052 0.031 -0.151** -0.084 -0.195** 
 (0.038) (0.086) (0.053) (0.030) (0.048) (0.039) (0.054) (0.073) (0.060) (0.059) (0.115) (0.078) 
Districts -0.010 0.002 -0.016 -0.010 0.005 -0.011 -0.102*** -0.061** -0.120*** -0.036 -0.040 -0.042 
 (0.016) (0.037) (0.021) (0.011) (0.021) (0.013) (0.032) (0.028) (0.043) (0.032) (0.055) (0.038) 
Women in Natl Parliament -0.020 -0.093*** 0.012 -0.006 -0.000 -0.005 -0.041** -0.036 -0.040** -0.050*** -0.047 -0.053*** 
 (0.014) (0.025) (0.021) (0.009) (0.019) (0.012) (0.016) (0.023) (0.019) (0.014) (0.034) (0.018) 
Employment Gap 0.033*** 0.043* 0.030** -0.034*** -0.046** -0.027*** -0.054*** -0.097*** -0.031 -0.027 0.021 -0.056** 
 (0.011) (0.026) (0.015) (0.011) (0.020) (0.010) (0.020) (0.026) (0.026) (0.019) (0.033) (0.025) 
Religiosity -0.009 -0.028** -0.002 0.007 0.008 0.007 -0.001 -0.007 0.005 -0.006 -0.010 -0.008 
 (0.006) (0.012) (0.009) (0.005) (0.009) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.008) (0.023) (0.011) 
Age -0.021** -0.000 -0.031*** -0.003 -0.016 0.002 0.023*** 0.013 0.026*** 0.012 0.019 0.009 
 (0.010) (0.017) (0.010) (0.008) (0.015) (0.008) (0.009) (0.021) (0.007) (0.008) (0.021) (0.009) 
Constant 0.019 2.127 -0.748 -0.411 0.013 -0.763 0.273 1.529 -0.576 0.895 -0.464 1.847 
 (0.951) (1.522) (1.374) (0.615) (1.149) (0.763) (1.135) (1.796) (1.183) (0.951) (2.155) (1.138) 
             
Observations 745 273 472 745 273 472 745 273 472 745 273 472 
Pseudo R2 0.0427 0.0910 0.0456 0.00945 0.0208 0.0159 0.0696 0.0965 0.0700 0.0330 0.0340 0.0517 
Wald Χ2 (12) 112.5 31.09 80.03 45.20 12.46 84.59 61.71 57.11 60.85 32.43 8.734 27.44 
Prob > Χ2  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.132 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.365 0.000 
Standard errors clustered on 28 countries in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table S3.5: Political Experience and National Gender Quotas: Belonging to Religiosity Measure 
 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES National Party Office Former MPs Local Politicians Incumbents 
 All Female Male All Female Male All Female Male All Female Male 
             
National Gender Quota 0.349* 0.209 0.404** 0.208 0.484*** 0.139 0.012 0.045 0.028 -0.384** -0.117 -0.538*** 
 (0.207) (0.320) (0.176) (0.142) (0.132) (0.184) (0.138) (0.119) (0.183) (0.185) (0.205) (0.186) 
Closed List 0.046 0.077 0.074 -0.613** -1.714*** -0.145 0.597*** 0.373 0.671** 0.893** 0.697 0.962** 
 (0.373) (0.549) (0.407) (0.306) (0.215) (0.392) (0.226) (0.257) (0.304) (0.417) (0.427) (0.429) 
Disproportionality 0.077 0.061 0.103 0.102** 0.071* 0.123 0.095* 0.025 0.119* 0.063 -0.014 0.088 
 (0.055) (0.109) (0.063) (0.051) (0.038) (0.079) (0.054) (0.053) (0.072) (0.072) (0.110) (0.077) 
# of Districts -0.096** -0.098 -0.115*** -0.115*** -0.174*** -0.099*** 0.025 0.009 0.031 -0.023 -0.079** 0.007 
 (0.039) (0.068) (0.035) (0.019) (0.036) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.028) (0.021) (0.034) (0.022) 
Women in Natl Parliament -0.022 -0.028 -0.016 -0.000 -0.015 0.003 0.059*** 0.032* 0.068*** 0.027 -0.017 0.044** 
 (0.021) (0.033) (0.023) (0.018) (0.021) (0.024) (0.017) (0.019) (0.024) (0.022) (0.030) (0.021) 
Women with Degree 0.007 -0.005 0.012 0.032*** 0.035*** 0.030*** 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.004 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
Religiosity 0.004 -0.010 0.009 0.017*** 0.005 0.024*** -0.001 -0.007 0.001 0.002 -0.003 0.001 
 (0.008) (0.016) (0.009) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.012) (0.010) (0.013) (0.010) 
Age 0.023** 0.039 0.015 0.045*** 0.052*** 0.043*** 0.021*** 0.045*** 0.011 0.053*** 0.058*** 0.055*** 
 (0.011) (0.024) (0.013) (0.007) (0.015) (0.011) (0.007) (0.012) (0.010) (0.006) (0.012) (0.009) 
Constant -3.530* -2.134 -4.060* -8.243*** -7.619*** -8.378*** -4.302*** -3.915*** -4.318** -4.611** -2.570 -5.615*** 
 (1.904) (2.723) (2.231) (1.394) (1.768) (2.013) (1.269) (1.408) (1.710) (1.797) (2.206) (1.882) 
Observations 752 276 476 752 276 476 751 275 476 752 276 476 
Pseudo R2 0.0442 0.0485 0.0536 0.178 0.252 0.155 0.0618 0.0673 0.0687 0.0799 0.0830 0.0948 
Wald Χ2 (12) 30.47 7.652 36.28 163.3 234.4 117.9 60.76 45.89 28.34 157 38.35 126.1 
Prob > Χ2  0.000 0.468 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors clustered on 28 parties in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table S3.5: Professional Experience and National Gender Quotas: Religiosity Measure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Legal Economics and Finance International Affairs PhD 
 All Female Male All Female Male All Female Male All Female Male 
             
National Gender Quota 0.464*** 0.833*** 0.314*** -0.103 0.077 -0.192*** 0.325** 0.363** 0.307** 0.260 -0.191 0.459** 
 (0.090) (0.183) (0.096) (0.080) (0.144) (0.068) (0.127) (0.171) (0.147) (0.160) (0.177) (0.200) 
Closed List 0.111 -0.359 0.300 0.273 -0.330 0.567*** -0.693** -0.851* -0.596 -0.187 0.020 -0.222 
 (0.206) (0.371) (0.254) (0.177) (0.379) (0.156) (0.325) (0.458) (0.366) (0.322) (0.572) (0.327) 
Disproportionality -0.061 -0.218** 0.004 -0.002 0.029 -0.013 0.017 -0.012 0.045 -0.133** -0.064 -0.165** 
 (0.044) (0.085) (0.056) (0.037) (0.064) (0.042) (0.063) (0.094) (0.067) (0.059) (0.116) (0.073) 
# of Districts -0.020 -0.013 -0.025 0.001 0.019 -0.003 -0.082*** -0.026 -0.109*** -0.028 -0.047 -0.023 
 (0.016) (0.037) (0.020) (0.013) (0.032) (0.012) (0.029) (0.037) (0.037) (0.031) (0.043) (0.037) 
Women in Natl Parliament -0.026 -0.099*** 0.006 -0.004 -0.001 -0.003 -0.028 -0.017 -0.034 -0.041** -0.037 -0.040* 
 (0.017) (0.026) (0.023) (0.012) (0.023) (0.013) (0.021) (0.033) (0.021) (0.017) (0.035) (0.022) 
Women with degree -0.009* -0.010 -0.008 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.012** 0.019*** 0.006 0.009 0.005 0.012 
 (0.005) (0.009) (0.007) (0.003) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
Regular Service Attendance -0.004 -0.020 0.003 0.001 -0.002 0.003 -0.009 -0.024* 0.001 -0.009 -0.002 -0.014 
 (0.007) (0.013) (0.010) (0.005) (0.010) (0.006) (0.010) (0.013) (0.012) (0.008) (0.016) (0.012) 
Age -0.021** -0.002 -0.031*** -0.002 -0.013 0.003 0.024*** 0.013 0.026*** 0.012 0.016 0.009 
 (0.010) (0.019) (0.010) (0.008) (0.015) (0.008) (0.009) (0.020) (0.007) (0.008) (0.020) (0.009) 
Constant 2.033 4.519** 1.031 -1.494 -0.977 -1.861** -2.599 -3.141 -2.139 -1.168 -1.480 -1.210 
 (1.291) (2.169) (1.564) (0.986) (2.130) (0.942) (1.736) (2.602) (1.873) (1.714) (2.958) (1.808) 
Observations 745 273 472 745 273 472 745 273 472 745 273 472 
Pseudo R2 0.0404 0.0869 0.0437 0.00413 0.00994 0.0131 0.0626 0.0780 0.0670 0.0338 0.0337 0.0444 
Wald Χ2 (12) 137.4 31.46 86.48 8.725 4.517 42.18 42.79 24 49.79 35.85 9.865 16.53 
Prob > Χ2  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.366 0.808 0.000 0.000 0.00229 0.000 0.000 0.275 0.0354 
Standard errors clustered on 28 parties in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
